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I. INTRODUCTION 
The growth in size and number of employee benefit plans led 
Congress to enact the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in the mid-1970s.1  Among other things, ERISA mandates 
certain standards of conduct and responsibility from fiduciaries of 
employee benefit plans and provides appropriate civil remedies to protect 
the interests of participants and beneficiaries in the plans.2  Cofiduciary 
contribution and indemnification, however, are not explicitly set forth in 
ERISA.3 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the ERISA cofiduciary 
contribution question directly, it held in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc.,4 that a right of contribution may generally arise in one of 
two ways: (1) through an act of Congress, express or implicit, or (2) 
through the power of federal courts to fashion the statute’s federal 
common law.5  It is this analysis that courts should employ when 
determining whether cofiduciaries may bring claims for contribution or 
indemnification.  This Comment addresses a circuit split on ERISA 
cofiduciary contribution, with a critique of the analyses that the courts 
employed.6 
 
*  J.D., 2019, University of Kansas School of Law; B.A., 2016, Kansas State University.  I would 
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 1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
 2. Id. § 1001(b). 
 3. See Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In 
ERISA, congress never dealt with contribution expressly, so the question is whether such a right can 
be recognized either by implication from the statute, or as a part of federal common law.”). 
 4. 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
 5. Id. at 638 (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 90–91 (1980)).  Texas 
Industries examined the issue under the antitrust statutes, whereas Northwest examined the question 
under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
 6. Compare Chemung Canal Tr. Co., 939 F.2d at 18 (holding there are such remedies), and 
Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016) (same), with Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of 
Am. v. IADA Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 862, 863 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding there are no such remedies), 
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By applying the groundwork laid out by the Supreme Court in Texas 
Industries, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits came to the correct conclusion 
in declining to find cofiduciary contribution and indemnification in 
ERISA.  Nonetheless, even in coming to the correct conclusion, both 
courts’ analyses left more to be desired.  Each court approached the 
question with its own structure for the analysis.  This structure resulted in 
differing rationales for the holdings even among circuit courts which 
arrived at the same conclusion.  If, instead, the circuit courts followed 
Supreme Court guidance, their opinions would have aligned more 
closely, and perhaps more of the circuit courts would have reached the 
correct conclusion. 
Because cofiduciary contribution and indemnification are not found 
explicitly in ERISA, courts must find those remedies implicitly.  Thus, 
the courts should also have applied the step-by-step set of guidelines 
established by the Supreme Court for this purpose in Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington,7 in determining that ERISA does not provide for 
cofiduciary contribution and indemnification.8 
The circuit courts that have analyzed the issue have done so in 
different ways—boldly immersing themselves into the sea of 
congressional intent, which is itself mired by additional considerations 
concerning statutory construction, legislative history, and the assumedly 
well-fashioned arguments of two opposing counsel.  This alone should 
not have proved to be too difficult, but for the fact that courts have the 
ability to develop ERISA through their construction of a federal common 
law.  This latter point seems to have thrown an otherwise straightforward 
analysis into disarray.  Nonetheless, like ERISA’s structured statutory 
makeup, any legal analysis of its issues should likewise be structured. 
Many courts examining the ERISA contribution issue—especially 
the lower courts—generally make no distinction between contribution 
and indemnification.9  This is because the arguments for and against such 
cofiduciary remedies generally do not consider whether one is more 
 
and Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432–34 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 7. 442 U.S. 560, 575–76 (1979) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). 
 8. Id. at 576. 
 9. See Chemung, 939 F.2d at 15–18 (holding ERISA may provide a cause of action for 
contribution or indemnity after focusing its analysis on whether contribution is an appropriate 
equitable remedy); Chesemore, 829 F.3d at 811–13 (revisiting the question of whether 
indemnification is an appropriate equitable remedy under ERISA and coupling both indemnity and 
contribution in holding that they are appropriate remedies); Travelers, 497 F.3d at 863–67 (holding 
that contribution, indemnity, and restitution claims are not available under ERISA, but solely 
analyzing the contribution remedy); Kim, 871 F.2d at 1434 (dismissing a third-party claim for 
contribution or indemnity under ERISA after holding that ERISA does not recognize a right of 
contribution). 
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appropriate than the other.  Instead, the arguments couple them together 
since both cofiduciary contribution and indemnification would need to be 
implied into the statute as neither is explicitly found therein.  It may also 
be that this intentional oversight is due to the fact that plaintiffs bring suit 
under both remedial theories, given that, one, they cannot be sure of 
which one will be available to them and, two, a plaintiff can only have 
one of the remedies and not both.10  Finally, note that the contribution 
and indemnity remedies discussed in this Comment are limited to those 
remedies available by court decision rather than those that are established 
by contract.11 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Roadmap to the Current Circuit Split 
The circuit courts that have addressed ERISA cofiduciary 
contribution and indemnification have come up short in their analyses.  
These courts provided little structure or substance for their neighboring 
bar members to use in their own attempts at advocacy on either side of 
the argument.  The Second and Seventh Circuits have found ERISA to 
allow cofiduciary contribution and indemnification.12  The Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have declined to do so.13  What follows is a discussion of 
how they got there. 
1. The Second Circuit 
Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland,14 started as do 
all too many of these ERISA cases: the trustee, an individual, made poor 
 
 10. George L. Flint, Jr. & Philip W. Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary Has No Right to 
Contribution and Indemnity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 7, 7–8 (2003). 
 11. See id. at 8 (“Contribution and indemnity may be a contractual obligation or imposed by a 
court without agreement.”). 
 12. See Chemung, 939 F.2d at 16 (“We thus conclude that the traditional trust law right to 
contribution must also be recognized as a part of ERISA.”); Chesemore, 829 F.3d at 812 (“We 
addressed this issue long ago and held that ERISA’s grant of equitable remedial power and its 
foundation in principles of trust law permit the courts to order contribution or indemnification 
among cofiduciaries based on degrees of culpability.”) (citing Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337 
(7th Cir. 1984)). 
 13. See Travelers, 497 F.3d at 866 (“Nor are we persuaded to infer that Congress inadvertently 
omitted a right to contribution from ERISA’s remedial scheme.  The statute pays specific attention to 
the rights and obligations of fiduciaries in some respects, but makes no reference to a right of 
contribution.”); Kim, 871 F.2d at 1434 (“Fujikawa’s third-party claim necessarily fails since ERISA, 
the governing substantive law, does not recognize a right of contribution.”). 
 14. 939 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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investment decisions on behalf of an ERISA plan for Fairway Spring 
Company (“Fairway”).15  Fairway removed the original trustee within 
three years and replaced him with Sovran Bank, but the poor investments 
did not begin to surface for another two years, at which time Fairway 
replaced Sovran Bank with Chemung Canal Trust.16  Chemung then 
brought an action against Sovran Bank alleging a breach of fiduciary 
duty for “lack of prudence” and for failing to do their due diligence 
regarding the original investments and other questionable investments 
made by Sovran Bank.17  Sovran Bank promptly countersued everyone 
that could possibly be considered a fiduciary for the plan, including 
Chemung and Fairway, arguing that if Sovran Bank had lacked prudence, 
so had the others in managing the initial bad investments and the fallout 
thereafter.18  Sovran Bank also requested contribution and indemnity in 
case it were to be found liable.19  The district court quickly dismissed 
Sovran Bank’s claims for fiduciary liability on the part of the other 
parties because, as a former fiduciary, Sovran Bank lacked standing to 
sue.20 
The district court then proceeded to analyze the contribution and 
indemnification question by first citing the Supreme Court’s instructions 
for where to find such remedies: either through congressional intent as 
implied in the statute or through federal common law.21  Looking first for 
congressional intent, the district court found none after relying primarily 
on the methodology used in Supreme Court case Cort v. Ash22 for 
determining whether a private right of action should be implied from a 
statute.23  The district court then looked at whether it could create such 
remedies by using the federal common law.24  After examining Supreme 
 
 15. Id. at 13. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 13–14.  
 18. Id. at 14. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.   
 21. Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 753 F. Supp. 81, 84 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing 
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
939 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 22. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
 23. Chemung, 753 F. Supp. at 85.  While the district court did not explicitly invoke the Cort v. 
Ash test, it examined factors that were described by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.  The Second 
Circuit described the district court’s methodology in applying the Cort v. Ash test.  See Chemung, 
939 F.2d at 15 (stating that the district court relied primarily on the methodology of Cort v. Ash); see 
also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (describing four factors in determining whether a private 
remedy is implicit in a statute). 
 24. Chemung, 753 F. Supp. at 85–86. 
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Court precedent, the district court held that “courts may develop 
substantive common law under ERISA only where it is consistent with 
congressional intent.”25  Having found no such intent, it declined to 
develop such remedies.26 
The Second Circuit respectfully disagreed with the district court’s 
analysis.  While it affirmed the district court’s holding on the question of 
standing, it bypassed all congressional intent tests by stating that 
contribution is not a “right of action” but rather a “procedural device for 
equitably distributing responsibility for a plaintiff’s losses.”27  In this 
manner, the court jumped to a federal common law analysis and 
distinguished ERISA from other areas of law in which the Supreme 
Court had been reluctant to formulate a right of contribution.28  Unlike 
antitrust law, the Equal Pay Act, and Title VII, the court held that 
ERISA’s “legislative history and the statute itself clearly contemplate 
development of a federal common law.”29  It then further distinguished 
the case from Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,30 
where the Supreme Court declined to create new substantive remedial 
rights, by pointing out that Russell dealt with “extracontractual, 
compensatory and punitive damages,” and not common law remedies.31  
As to why there is no mention of contribution or indemnification in the 
statute, the court reasoned that Congress focused its attention on the 
“welfare of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries,” intending for 
courts to “fill any gaps,” such as the allocation of liability among 
cofiduciaries, by looking to “trust law principles.”32  Thus, it concluded 
that contribution and indemnification are available remedies under 
ERISA.33  The Supreme Court denied certiorari, but three justices were 
open to examining the question.34 
 
 25. Id. at 86. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Chemung, 939 F.2d at 15. 
28.Id. at 16.  
 29. Id. at 17 (distinguishing Chemung from Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 
U.S. 630 (1981) (antitrust laws) and Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 
77 (1981) (Equal Pay Act and Title VII)).  
 30. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
 31. Chemung, 939 F.2d at 17–18 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 138 
(1985)). 
 32. Id. at 18. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Fairway Spring Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 505 U.S. 1212 (1992); see also Chemung 
Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992) 
(No. 91-6891).  Justices White, Blackmun, and O’Connor would have granted certiorari.  
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2. The Seventh Circuit 
In Chesemore v. Fenkell, the Seventh Circuit dealt with another 
ERISA tale of woe: a failed Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).35 
The defendant, Fenkell, had made a business of buying closely-held 
companies which were partially owned by an ESOP, folding the acquired 
ESOP into his own company’s ESOP, and then spinning off the acquired 
company at a profit some time later.36  In this particular endeavor, 
however, he bought a business in 2002 that later in 2006 no one had any 
interest in buying at a higher price.37  Not to be discouraged, he spun off 
the previously acquired business in a series of transactions that resulted, 
amongst many things, in the new company establishing an ESOP to buy 
out all of Fenkell’s interests in the previously acquired company.38  To 
accomplish this end, the new business’ ESOP took out a massive loan 
while collateralizing all the employees’ accounts in the new ESOP.39  
Then 2008 came along, and with it the Great Recession, and soon enough 
the stock in the new ESOP was worthless as the ESOP struggled to pay 
off its loan.40  The now empty-handed employees sued all the fiduciaries 
that had been in charge of looking after their best interests throughout 
these transactions, including the trustees that Fenkell hand-picked to 
ensure the sale occurred on his terms.41  Not surprisingly, the district 
court found Fenkell liable, which he did not contest, and also ordered 
him to indemnify his cofiduciaries who had been “mere musicians” to his 
orchestral conduction.42  Fenkell appealed.43 
The Seventh Circuit looked to ERISA § 502(a)(3) which “broadly 
permits the court to fashion ‘appropriate equitable relief’ in response to a 
claim.”44  It noted that because ERISA generally incorporated the law of 
trusts, the courts were able to incorporate equitable remedies under trust 
law—of which indemnification and contribution were two.45  The court 
then addressed the argument that since ERISA § 409(a) limits fiduciary 
liability to a plan, the implication is that a fiduciary cannot be made 
 
 35. 829 F.3d 803, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 36. Id. at 806. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 806–07. 
 39. Id. at 807.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 811. 
 43. Id. at 807. 
 44. Id. at 811. 
 45. Id. at 811–12. 
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liable to another cofiduciary.46  The court dismissed this argument, 
explaining that it previously denied such an implication because of 
ERISA’s “grant of equitable remedial power” to the courts and “its 
foundation in principles of trust law.”47 
In Free v. Briody, the Seventh Circuit determined that although 
ERISA § 405 allows for cofiduciaries to allocate duties, and thus 
liability, this provision was not the exclusive means of allocating 
liability.48  Here again, Congress intended to codify principles of trust 
law into ERISA, so the Seventh Circuit held that the courts have the 
power to borrow from those principles under appropriate circumstances 
and to apportion “damages equitably between the wrongdoers.”49  
Finally, addressing Russell’s limitation on ERISA remedies, the court 
distinguished Russell similar to how the Second Circuit distinguished 
Russell, explaining that it only referred to extracontractual damages and 
not equitable remedies.50  The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the district 
court’s order of indemnification.51  Fenkell petitioned for certiorari, but 
the writ was dismissed before the United States Supreme Court came to 
it.52 
3. The Eighth Circuit 
In the Eighth Circuit, Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. 
IADA Services, Inc. began with a Department of Labor (DOL) audit and 
allegations of prohibited transactions between a trust and IADA Services, 
who was the employer of some of the trustees.53  The trustees, who 
allowed the prohibited transactions to occur, settled, and Travelers, as 
their insurer, bore the whole cost of the settlement.54  Travelers then sued 
IADA Services to recover some of what they had paid out under theories 
of contribution and indemnification.55  The district court declined 
awarding Travelers those remedies, finding that neither the statute nor 
federal common law made them available.56 
 
 46. Id. at 812. 
 47. Id. (citing Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting Free, 732 F.2d at 1337). 
 50. Id. at 813. 
 51. Id. at 817. 
 52. Fenkell v. All. Holdings, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 827 (2017). 
 53. 497 F.3d 862, 863 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 54. Id. at 863–64. 
 55. Id. at 864. 
 56. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. IADA Servs., Inc., No. 4:05–cv–212–RAW, 2006 WL 
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit began its analysis by examining 
whether “‘federal common law’ . . . should provide that an ERISA 
fiduciary found liable . . . may bring an action for contribution against 
another fiduciary that allegedly bears some responsibility for the 
violations.”57  In doing so, the court noted “that the Supreme Court has 
declined to recognize a federal common law right of contribution under 
three other federal statutes.”58  The appellant then raised similar 
arguments as those in Chemung, and tried to distinguish ERISA by 
explaining that, unlike antitrust or other areas of law, Congress expected 
that federal courts would develop a federal common law, which, when 
guided by the common law of trusts, would allow them to recognize a 
right of contribution among cofiduciaries.59  The Eighth Circuit replied 
that such an approach was an overstatement of its authority to develop 
ERISA common law.60  In general, while courts did have such authority, 
“the Supreme Court has emphasized time and again that the statute’s 
carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it 
simply forgot to incorporate expressly.”61  Further, it held that 
Congress’s intent for the development of ERISA common law was not 
enough by itself to specifically allow for contribution, even if it such a 
remedy was available under trust law.62  The Eighth Circuit pointed to 
admiralty law, another common law area that in some circumstances may 
allow an action for contribution, but for which the Supreme Court had 
refrained from allowing such a remedy when it “might interfere with an 
interrelated statutory scheme.”63 
The Eight Circuit then addressed Travelers’s suggestion that 
statutorily there was a way for it to recover from a cofiduciary.  Travelers 
 
8437388, *3–4 (S.D. Iowa May 26, 2006). 
 57. Travelers, 497 F.3d at 864 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 864–65. 
 60. Id. at 865. 
 61. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 864–65. 
 63. Id. at 865–66 (citing Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 
285–86 (1952)).  In Halcyon, the Supreme Court declined to allow contribution in maritime law 
where although it was “freer than common-law courts in fashioning rules . . . .  Congress ha[d] 
already enacted much legislation in the area of maritime personal injuries.”  Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 
285.  Thus, it concluded that “the solution of this problem should await congressional action.”  Id.  
Thereafter, Congress did act, amending the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act twenty years later.  See George K. Fuiaxis, Note, Indemnification or Comparative Fault: Should 
a Tortfeasor’s Right to Receive “Ryan Indemnity” in Maritime Law Sink or Swim in the Presence of 
Comparative Fault?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1622–35 (1999) (first describing Halcyon then the 
rise of Ryan’s Indemnity and eventually Congress’s amendments). 
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argued that ERISA § 409(a) subjected a breaching fiduciary to “such 
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate”—
and therefore such appropriate relief should be contribution.64  The court 
replied that such remedies should be read in favor of the plan’s benefit, 
and not “in favor of a breaching fiduciary.”65  Next, it batted away any 
inference that Congress inadvertently forgot to include contribution in its 
remedial scheme, concluding that ERISA was too comprehensive for that 
to be the case.66  Finally, it considered some policy arguments, but 
explained that such considerations were best left to the legislative 
process.67  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.68 
4. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to address the ERISA 
contribution question in Kim v. Fujikawa, which involved a 
multiemployer collective bargaining plan.69  It began when the employer 
trustee, Kim, became aware that some union trustees on the outer islands 
of Hawaii were actively engaged in performing union work.70  Because 
the plan had been paying for their services, their engagement in union 
work made those payments prohibited transactions.71  Kim sued 
Fujikawa along with the other outer island union trustees, alleging a 
breach of fiduciary duty and liability for all the payments.72  The parties 
were found liable,73 and Fujikawa satisfied the judgment.74  The 
judgment, however, only covered the prohibited transactions up to trial, 
and Kim brought another suit to recover the prohibited transactions that 
were paid out between the trial and the judgment.75  This time, Fujikawa 
counterclaimed, seeking a right of contribution from Kim for 
participating in the maintenance of the prohibited practice.76  The district 
 
 64. Travelers, 497 F.3d at 866 (quoting ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)). 
 65. Id. (quoting Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989)).  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 866–67. 
 68. Id. at 868. 
 69. 871 F.2d 1427, 1428–29 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 70. Id. at 1429.  Coincidentally, this only came to the attention of the employer trustee after he 
was informed that the union trustees were in charge of a strike on the outer islands.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 1429–30.  
 72. See id. at 1429. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 1431. 
 75. Id.  About four months elapsed between trial and when the court rendered a judgment. 
 76. Id. 
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court dismissed his counterclaim, and Fujikawa appealed.77 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis was brief.  It quickly dismissed 
Fujikawa’s contention that contribution was a broad and equitable 
remedy provided for in the latter half of ERISA § 409(a).78  It stated that 
the particular statute only established remedies for the benefit of the plan 
and not a breaching fiduciary.79  Furthermore, it noted that due to 
ERISA’s overall comprehensiveness and reticulation, “it seem[ed] clear 
that ‘Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies [under ERISA] 
that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’”80  This was especially 
true, the court continued, when: 
[T]he party seeking contribution is a member of the class [e.g., 
fiduciaries] whose activities Congress intended to regulate for the 
protection and benefit of an entirely distinct class [e.g., ERISA plans], 
and where there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress 
was concerned with softening the blow on joint wrongdoers.81 
The court therefore affirmed the district court opinion.82  The Ninth 
Circuit reiterated its position on cofiduciary contribution four months 
later in Call v. Sumitomo Bank of California, but without any analysis as 
it relied on Kim for the determination.83 
While the four circuits examined the same question, whether a court 
ruled in favor of or against contribution and indemnification depended on 
the amount of latitude the court gave itself to interpret ERISA and its 
powers under federal common law.84  Additionally, it is possible the 
specific case facts may have played a role in influencing the courts’ 
decisions.  The Ninth Circuit dealt with union trustees that supported a 
union strike and then sought contribution from the employer trustees 
(whom, we can assume, represented the very people the defendants were 
striking against).85  The Eighth Circuit dealt with an insurance company 
 
 77. Id. at 1432. 
 78. Id. 1432–33. 
 79. Id. at 1432 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)). 
 80. Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 145).  
 81. Id. at 1433 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Id. at 1436. 
 83. 881 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 84. Compare Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that “ERISA’s 
grant of equitable remedial power . . . permit[s] the courts to order contribution or indemnification among 
cofiduciaries”), with Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. IADA Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 862, 864–65 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that ERISA’s detailed enforcement scheme shows Congress did not intend to recognize 
a right of contribution). 
 85. Kim, 871 F.2d at 1431. 
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that tried to place some of the blame on the individuals it had been paid 
to insure.86  In both cases, these were not sympathetic parties.  On the 
other hand, the Seventh Circuit allowed the defendants to recover from 
an individual who orchestrated the whole disaster,87 and the Second 
Circuit analyzed a scenario in which the plan dealt with a revolving door 
of trustees and administrators who all may or may not have had a hand in 
its poor administration.88 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Texas Industries established 
precedent providing instructions for determining whether a claim for 
contribution may be implied in a statute and limitations on how courts 
may develop federal common law.89  The circuit courts should have 
approached the issue using this uniform analysis, which, when properly 
applied, should have led them to hold that ERISA does not allow for 
claims for contribution or indemnification. 
B. Finding a Cause of Action Where There Is None Explicitly Stated 
The Supreme Court has held that a right of contribution may arise in 
one of two ways: (1) through an act of Congress, expressly or implicitly, 
or (2) through the power of federal courts to fashion the statute’s federal 
common law.90  It is this analysis that courts should employ when 
determining whether cofiduciaries may bring claims for contribution or 
indemnification. 
This two-part approach originated in 1981 in Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
v. Transport Workers Union of America, where the Court employed the 
analysis in determining there was no right to contribution under the 
Equal Pay Act and Title VII.91  Later, in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., the Supreme Court again employed the analysis in 
determining there was no right to contribution under antitrust law.92  A 
little while later, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of 
Wausau, the Court distinguished the applicability of the test depending 
 
 86. Travelers, 497 F.3d at 864. 
 87. Chesemore, 829 F.3d at 807.  
 88. Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12, 13–14 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 89. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–46 (1981). 
 90. Id. at 638 (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90–91 
(1981)).  Texas Industries examined the issue under the antitrust statutes; Northwest Airlines had 
examined the question under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Id. 
 91. Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90–91. 
 92. Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 646. 
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on the act to which the courts were applying the test.93  In Musick, the 
Court found that the right to contribution is available under Rule 10b-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act.94  However, the Court did so because, 
unlike in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, the statute in Musick 
was not “express in creating the substantive damages liability for which 
contribution was sought.”95  The dissent, on the other hand, rejected such 
a distinction and, using the normal test, came to the opposite 
conclusion.96  Even circuit courts have acknowledged this analysis as the 
appropriate one for determining whether a remedy for contribution 
should be available.97 
ERISA creates liability under express remedial provisions, provides 
for substantive damages, and establishes a way for fiduciaries to limit 
 
 93. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 298 (1993) 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 290–91. 
 96. Compare id. at 292–97 (quoting Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 
(1991)) (flipping the analysis on its head by starting first with determining that “‘where a legal 
structure of private statutory rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent,’ 
a federal court has the limited power to define the ‘contours of that structure’” to show that the court 
had the authority to establish federal common law; and then secondly looking for what “Congress 
might have done” based on several sections that allow for rights of contribution in the case of other 
violations), with id. at 302 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The proper analysis flows from our well-
established approach to implied causes of action in general and to implied rights of contribution in 
particular.  When deciding whether a statute confers a private right of action, we ask whether 
Congress—either expressly or by implication—intended to create such a remedy.  Where Congress 
did not expressly create a contribution remedy, we may infer that Congress nevertheless intended by 
clear implication to confer a right to contribution.  Through the exercise of their power to craft 
federal common law, federal courts may also fashion a right to contribution.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  See also Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 425–26 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing Musick, 508 U.S. at 291) (“When a statute creates a private right of action but fails to provide 
expressly for a right to contribution, particularly if the remedial scheme created is detailed, 
Congress’s silence with regard to contribution weights [sic] heavily against implying such a right 
because there is a presumption that the silence reflects congressional intent not to create such a right.  
On the other hand, when courts have implied a right of action it would be ‘futile’ to look for 
congressional intent to create a right to contribution, inasmuch as Congress did not intend explicitly 
to create the cause of action on which such a right would be based.”).  
 97. See BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90–91 (1981) (“[T]he 
district court likened the attempt to claim credit for the settlements to a claim for contribution, which 
would only exist under the Copyright Act if either Congress created such a right, expressly or 
implicitly, or the courts created such a right as a matter of federal common law.”); see also In re 
Dep’t of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 968 F.2d 27, 34 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1992) 
(explaining that in deciding whether restitution was available under the Economic Stabilization Act, 
“we have the clear guidance of the Supreme Court.  In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers 
Union, the Court concluded that a federal cause of action is created either through the affirmative 
creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear implication, or, absent 
legislation, through the power of federal courts to fashion . . . federal common law”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)); Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Barracuda Tanker 
Corp., 696 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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their liabilities, thus aligning it with Texas Industries and Northwest 
Airlines rather than with Musick.98  Therefore, to correctly determine 
whether ERISA allows contribution or indemnification, one must first 
look for congressional intent and then examine whether federal common 
law provides an avenue for their inclusion. 
1. Whether a Cause of Action Is Implicit—The Touche Test 
In Northwest Airlines, the Court pointed to cases such as Cort v. Ash 
as examples of analyses for courts to use to determine whether a cause of 
action exists.99  Cort v. Ash provided four factors to which it lent each 
equal weight: (1) congressional intent, (2) legislative history, (3) whether 
the remedies are “necessary to make effective the congressional 
purpose,”100 and (4) whether it is appropriate to limit the remedies to 
those supplied by state law.101 At the time, however, the Court was 
slowly formulating this analysis, and eventually settled on an analysis 
more akin to that set out in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.102  These 
later cases still examined the factors but converted congressional intent 
into the determinative factor.103 
In Touche, the Court explains this divergence: 
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it 
considered “relevant” in determining whether a private remedy is 
implicit in a statute not expressly providing one.  But the Court did not 
decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight.  The central 
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly 
or by implication, a private cause of action.  Indeed, the first three 
factors discussed in Cort—the language and focus of the statute, its 
legislative history, and its purpose—are ones traditionally relied upon 
in determining legislative intent.104 
In this way, the Court still ends up looking at the first three factors of 
Cort, albeit under the umbrella of “congressional intent.”105  In fact, 
Touche modified the first factor from a general analysis of congressional 
 
 98. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1105(c), 1132 (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
 99. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981). 
 100. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80–84 (1975) (quoting J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 
(1964)), abrogation recognized by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2018)). 
 101. Id. at 84–85. 
 102. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
 103. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188–89 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting 
this trend and that Touche effectively overruled Cort v. Ash). 
 104. Touche, 442 U.S. at 575–76 (internal citations omitted). 
 105. See id. 
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intent to a more focused look at the language of the statute for clues of 
congressional intent.106  As for the fourth factor, it seems the Court 
relegated it to almost a non-consideration.  However, as with many 
federal specific statutes and with ERISA in particular which specifically 
preempts state law,107 this fourth factor would likely nonetheless be 
irrelevant, and it is perhaps where the discussion on federal common law 
more appropriately takes its place. 
Therefore, courts analyzing whether cofiduciary contribution is 
implicitly found in ERISA should apply the more focused Touche test 
and determine congressional intent from the language of the statute, the 
legislative history, and whether the remedy furthers the purpose of the 
statute. 
a. Statutory Language 
In construing a statute, courts have several factors to consider.  First, 
courts “are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress 
used.”108  Canons of construction typically provide that when dealing 
with disjunctive conjunctions like “or,” courts ordinarily must assign 
separate meanings to the words separated by these conjunctions.109  In 
assigning these meanings, a court should not merely accept the broad 
dictionary definition of a word but rather choose one which fits “the 
specific context in which th[e] language is used, and the broader context 
of the statute as a whole.”110  In fact, assuming the word is not already 
defined in the statute, its meaning should generally be one in accordance 
with what it ordinarily means.111  If  the court determines that the 
statutory language is unambiguous—which is unlikely in a case like the 
current one, where the issue revolves around the ambiguity of the breadth 
of a statute—any further inquiry ceases.112  Otherwise, the court must 
then turn to legislative history.113  This analysis will be especially 
 
 106. Id. at 568 (“[A]s with any case involving the interpretation of a statute, our analysis must 
begin with the language of the statute itself.”). 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 108. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 
U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)). 
 109. Id.; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739–40 (1978). 
 110. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018). 
 111. Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (explaining that applying how a term is 
commonly understood is also applying the ordinary meaning). 
 112. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016) (quoting Barnhart 
v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). 
 113. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1084 (turning to analyze legislative history after being unable to 
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important when determining the meaning of “equitable relief” within 
ERISA. 
b. Legislative History 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s inclusion of the legislative history 
as one of the factors to consider when interpreting a statute came during 
a time prior to the late Justice Scalia’s ardent crusade against the use of 
such history in statutory interpretation.114  However, a dismissal of 
legislative history when dealing with an ERISA issue, especially one in 
which the arguments for the inclusion of a remedy rely so heavily on 
federal common law, would be a grievous injustice.  ERISA’s legislative 
history explicitly blesses the development of its federal common law.115  
Thus, applying what the courts would have known at the time of 
ERISA’s birth regarding legislative history establishes some guidelines. 
“[F]requently[,] the legislative history of a statute is the most fruitful 
source of instruction as to its proper interpretation . . . .”116  However, 
one must be cautious in such reliance.117  Often times, legislative history 
may be silent on an ambiguity.  In the case of an implied right of action, 
interpreting the silence as an authorization for the private right has been 
described as a “hazardous enterprise.”118  After all, silence can lead to 
 
determine the meaning of words from the language alone). 
 114. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Liess, Comment, Censoring Legislative History: Justice Scalia on 
the Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 568, 568–69 (1993).  
 115. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 55–56 (1989).  In addressing the issue, Professor George L. 
Flint explained:  
The House Budget Committee had received numerous complaints from constituents that 
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux left them with no legal remedy for improper denials of 
medical claims, improper denial of continuation coverage, or unreasonable delays in 
processing claims.  The Committee disagreed with that portion of Pilot Life refusing to 
develop a common law remedy, but felt it was not necessary to amend ERISA.  The 
Committee felt that the legislative history of ERISA clearly indicated that Congress 
intended courts, through federal common law, to develop “appropriate remedies, even if 
they are not specifically enumerated in section 502 of ERISA,” for improper claims 
processing.  The Committee reaffirmed the “authority of the Federal courts to shape legal 
and equitable remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before them, even 
though those remedies may not be specifically mentioned in ERISA,” by “drawing upon 
principles enunciated in state law, including such remedies as the awarding of punitive 
and/or compensatory damages against the person responsible for the failure to pay claims 
in a timely manner.” 
George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 964 n.44 (1995) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 55–56) (internal 
citations omitted); see also id. at 970–73 (discussing the federal common law of ERISA). 
 116. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151 (1960). 
 117. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977). 
 118. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979). 
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two competing inferences, one in favor of the implication and one 
against.119  Additionally, just because the legislative history contains 
examples illustrating certain points, it does not mean that the entirety of 
the statute is limited to them—examples are “just that,” examples, and 
are not meant to be exhaustive.120  Finally, as always, courts must 
remember to read the legislative history objectively and not 
“interpolat[e] [their] notions of policy in the interstices of legislative 
provisions.”121 
c. Purpose 
The “purpose” factor of the Touche test refers to whether the implied 
remedy is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme.”122  To ascertain purpose, the courts are left with examining the 
legislative scheme.  It seems that such a directive is nothing more than a 
repeat of the second factor, although it may arguably leave room for a 
broader interpretation of legislative history.  Fortunately for ERISA 
practitioners, ERISA’s purpose is found in 29 U.S.C. § 1001.  
Conveniently labeled “Congressional findings and declaration of policy,” 
this section provides a starting place for courts to determine the purpose 
against which they must compare the requested implied remedy.123  The 
section provides that Congress’s general goal in enacting the statute is to 
promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries by regulating 
the creation and administration of employee benefit plans.124  Such 
regulations and administrative requirements are meant to ensure the 
“soundness and stability of plans” so  that they may be well-funded and 
able to pay out any promised benefits.125 
Given that Touche has been precedent since the circuit split on 
cofiduciary contribution and indemnification in ERISA began, it is 
worthwhile to wonder why the circuit courts have not used its analysis.  
Except for the Second Circuit, no court explicitly stated why it did not 
use Touche, or a similar test, in coming to its conclusion.  This Comment 
will discuss some possible reasons later, but it will first address the 
 
 119. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (noting that 
a lack of congressional action can create “several equally tenable inferences” (quoting United States 
v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962))).  
 120. Id. at 649. 
 121. Piper, 430 U.S. at 26 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)). 
 122. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
 123. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).  
 124. See generally id.  
 125. Id. § 1001(a). 
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second way in which a claim for contribution may arise––via federal 
common law. 
2. Whether Courts May Fashion ERISA Common Law 
Most courts that have allowed remedies for contribution and 
indemnification in ERISA do so under the guise that they have the power 
as developers of the federal common law.126  While, generally, “[t]here 
is . . . ‘no federal general common law,’ . . . the Court has recognized the 
need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to 
be known as ‘federal common law.’”127  One of these areas is ERISA.128  
As a tool to help lower courts develop the common law, the Court 
pointed to the principles of trust law.129  These principles, it held, should 
apply to ERISA fiduciaries.130 
To what extent courts may use their authority to develop federal 
common law for ERISA depends largely on the philosophy of the court.  
Some have limited themselves from expanding the law, while others 
have not.131  Perhaps a reason for this is that the Court has never 
addressed when it is appropriate to create such law, instead limiting itself 
to deciding when it is not appropriate to do so.  For example, in Varity 
Corp. v. Howe, the Court noted that trust law principles are not 
necessarily determinative of ERISA common law.132  In fact, when 
applying trust law to ERISA, the Court has warned lower courts to take 
note of “competing congressional purposes”—arguably favoring a 
holding in line with a finding of congressional intent over a holding in 
 
 126. See, e.g., Chemung Canal Tr. Co., 939 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
“incorporating traditional trust law’s doctrine of contribution and indemnity into the law of ERISA is 
appropriate . . .” because “[C]ongress wanted courts to fill any gaps in the statute by looking to 
traditional trust law principles.”); Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting 
that ERISA “doesn’t specifically mention contribution or indemnity as a remedy. Instead, it broadly 
permits the court to fashion ‘appropriate equitable relief’”).  
 127. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Erie R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) & U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947)). 
 128. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“Given this language 
and history, we have held that courts are to develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations 
under ERISA-regulated plans.’” (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))). 
 129. See id. at 111 (discussing trust principles relating to standards of review of a trustee’s 
exercise of discretionary powers so as to apply them to ERISA). 
 130. Id. (“In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B), 
we are guided by principles of trust law.”). 
 131. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
541, 544–45 (1998) (comparing instances where courts have and have not created federal common 
law). 
 132. 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts often will inform, but will 
not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”). 
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line with a trust principle.133  As for remedies, the Supreme Court has 
also stated that courts should consider ERISA’s carefully integrated 
scheme as “strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize 
other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.”134 
Thus, the Supreme Court has provided lower courts with more 
warnings and less direction about when it is appropriate to develop 
federal common law.  Lower courts have been left largely to their own 
devices to determine when a case is appropriate for the development of 
ERISA’s federal common law.  Some authors have been highly critical 
of this development, accusing “lawyers representing plan administrators 
[to] have seriously undermined congressional intent by misapplying the 
doctrine of federal common law.”135 
Nonetheless, it is true that lower courts generally tend to be more 
apprehensive when the statute expressly covers an issue, so as to not 
“allow federal common law to rewrite ERISA’s carefully crafted 
statutory scheme.”136  Some circuits have limited this law making 
authority to situations in which it is necessary to “fill in interstitially or 
otherwise effectuate [ERISA’s] statutory pattern and purpose enacted . . . 
by Congress.”137  Only the Sixth Circuit has provided factors to 
determine when it is appropriate for the courts to fashion federal law.  In 
doing so, it has granted itself more latitude by considering “instances in 
which (1) ERISA is silent or ambiguous; (2) there is an awkward gap in 
the statutory scheme; or (3) federal common law is essential to the 
promotion of fundamental ERISA policies.”138  The Sixth Circuit does 
not limit itself to develop common law only when it furthers a 
 
 133. Id. (“[C]ourts may have to take account of competing congressional purposes, such as 
Congress’[s] desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation 
expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.”); see 
also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261–63 (1993) (criticizing “vague notions of a 
statute’s ‘basic purpose,’” but then explaining that in the particular issue at hand (third-party 
nonfiduciary liability), Congress’s attempt at and goal of balancing two competing interests––
“tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of benefitting employees and the subsidiary goal of 
containing pension costs”––overrides traditional trust law, which allowed for beneficiaries to recover 
from third parties for knowing participation in a trustee’s breach as non-fiduciaries).  
 134. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985). 
 135. Flint, supra note 115, at 959. 
 136. State St. Bank & Tr. v. Denman Tire Corp., 240 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 137. See Van Ormna v. Am. Ins., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. 
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)); see also id. at 89 (discussing the 
development of restitution plan that compliments ERISA’s purpose). 
 138. DiGeronimo Aggregates, LLC v. Zemla, 763 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Local 6-
0682 Int’l Union of Paper, Allied-Indus. Chem. & Energy Workers v. Nat’l Indus. Grp. Pension 
Plan, 342 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
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fundamental ERISA purpose, but it also allows itself this ability when 
ERISA is silent or there is an “awkward gap.”  As a result, the Sixth 
Circuit is more progressive, as other commentators have limited this 
rulemaking authority to instances where the created rule “further[s] the 
policy of the statute.”139 
A court’s decision on whether to develop federal common law likely 
comes down to the decision maker’s philosophy on the extent of judicial 
involvement in lawmaking.140  This Comment, however, will not discuss 
the arguments for or against the more conservative or the more liberal 
view.  Instead, this Comment strives to show that under the more 
conservative view, one cannot create a remedy of cofiduciary 
contribution under federal common law, and that under the more liberal 
view, courts should refrain from doing so by keeping in mind the 
Supreme Court’s caution in creating new remedies. 
III. ANALYSIS 
As previously explained, in situations where the remedial provisions 
of a statute are expressly provided, the proper analysis to determine an 
implicit right to contribution and indemnification must examine two 
areas: (1) acts of Congress, be they express or implicit; and (2) if 
necessary, the power of federal courts to fashion the statute’s federal 
common law.141 
This Section applies that test to determine whether cofiduciary 
contribution or indemnification are implicit in ERISA, and, finding that 
they are not, argues against creating them through federal common law.  
In determining that cofiduciary contribution is not implicit in ERISA, 
this Comment applies the Touche test.  The Second Circuit argues 
against the application of the test, but after determining that cofiduciary 
contribution and indemnification are rights of action rather than 
procedural devices, there is no reason not to apply the structured analysis 
of Touche, especially when the Supreme Court called for such an 
analysis when it established the steps for finding contribution as an 
 
 139. Flint, supra note 115, at 969.  
 140. Compare Brauch, supra note 131, at 563–71 (arguing for limited involvement out of respect 
for the separation of powers and the threat of inconsistent laws and regulations), with William K. 
Carr & Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need for a Strong Federal Common Law of 
ERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 221, 222–23 (1993) (arguing that courts have shied away from 
using their authority to apply traditional principles of equity, but instead should rely on “time-
honored principles of . . . common law”). 
 141. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981) (citing Nw. Airlines, 
Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 90–91 (1980)).  
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implicit remedy.142 
A. An Implicit Reading of Contribution and Indemnification Remedies 
Into ERISA 
1. Should Touche Apply? 
Four circuit courts have examined cofiduciary contribution and 
indemnification.143  None of them have expressly mentioned Touche or 
its test.  This begs the question of whether the Touche test is 
inappropriate.  The four circuit courts focused on federal common law 
and almost completely disregarded whether such a cause of action may 
be implied under a congressional intent analysis.  Only the Second 
Circuit attempted to dismiss the test as inappropriate, and even then, it 
was referring to the test as originally articulated in Cort v. Ash.144 
For example, the Eighth Circuit limited its review to whether “the 
‘federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated 
plans’ should provide that an ERISA fiduciary found liable for violating 
its obligations under the statute may bring an action for contribution 
against another fiduciary that allegedly bears some responsibility for the 
violations.”145  The Eighth Circuit thus did not even consider 
congressional intent outside of the federal common law analysis.146  The 
Ninth Circuit, for its part, did little to differentiate between a federal 
common law analysis and a congressional intent analysis in the woefully 
insufficient two paragraphs it designated to discussing the issue.147  
Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit did engage in a bit more detailed 
statutory interpretation in determining that the “equitable relief” in 
ERISA § 502(a)(3) includes contribution and indemnification.148  It made 
this determination in the context of defining the breadth of its remedial 
authority under the statute.149  Thus, while it did not explicitly state 
whether it applied any particular analysis, the court effectively employed 
 
 142. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981).  
 143. See generally Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. IADA Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 862 (8th 
Cir. 2007); Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1989); Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803 
(7th Cir. 2016); Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 144. Chemung, 939 F.2d at 15–16 (“Initially, we agree with Sovran that the Cort v. Ash 
methodology is an inappropriate tool for analyzing this case.”). 
 145. Travelers, 497 F.3d at 864 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Kim, 871 F.2d at 1432–33.  
 148. Chesemore, 829 F.3d at 811–13. 
 149. Id. at 812. 
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an analysis on whether the remedies were implicit in the statute. 
Interestingly, the Second Circuit explicitly chose not to apply the 
four-part Cort v. Ash test.  The court considered the test “too simplistic” 
because it determined that contribution was a “procedural device” rather 
than a “right of action,” and thus absolved itself of applying the test.150  
Instead, the Second Circuit limited its discussion of congressional intent 
by citing to case law that observed ERISA’s legislative history and the 
court’s authority to draw on principles of traditional trust law for the 
development of ERISA common law.151 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits did not explain why they skipped any 
congressional intent analysis in declining to find a remedy for 
cofiduciary contribution.  It is possible that because the statute is silent as 
to contribution or indemnification, the courts chose to forego the analysis 
of whether the remedies can be implied and instead focused their 
analysis entirely on whether their authority allowed them to create the 
common law remedies.  The Second Circuit, however, raised an 
argument that threatens the premise of this Comment: are contribution 
and indemnification procedural devices rather than causes of action and 
thus exempt from the Touche test?  The answer is a resounding no. 
The Second Circuit described contribution as a means of “allocating 
obligations among co-defendants and/or third parties,” and it is perhaps 
this distinction that nudged the court to consider contribution as a 
procedural device.152  Seventeen years after Chemung, a Connecticut 
district court attempted to provide more insight on this notion in 
Haddock v. Nationwide Financial Services, Inc.153  The district court first 
stated that “the right to seek contribution and indemnification . . . is a 
procedural device, implicit in the common law of trusts, for fairly 
distributing costs among all culpable parties regardless of whom the 
plaintiff chooses to sue directly.”154  The court then argued that allowing 
such a right is not the creation of an additional remedy, but rather the 
extension of the principles of the law of trusts into the federal common 
law of ERISA.155  The court, however, failed to explain why contribution 
 
 150. Chemung, 939 F.2d at 16 (“The four tests of Cort v. Ash are not well-designed to ferret out 
congressional intent at this level of dispute resolution.”). 
 151. See id. (discussing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989); 
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1055 (2d Cir. 1985); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462–63 
(10th Cir. 1978)). 
 152. Id. at 15. 
 153. Haddock v. Nationwide Fin. Servs., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358–61 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 154. Id. at 360. 
 155. Id. 
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and indemnification are procedural devices rather than remedies under 
the law of trusts.156 Furthermore, classifying contribution and 
indemnification as procedural devices then runs contrary to Seventh 
Circuit’s holding, in which cofiduciary contribution and indemnification 
were allowed as equitable remedies grounded in the law of trusts.157 
Such an assertion is simply not correct.  First, there is a distinction 
between contribution itself and the procedural device of impleader, 
which is used to join defendants to be able to more efficiently carry on 
suits.158  Impleader is “almost always” used to bring suits for contribution 
and allows for “efficient litigation by packaging the underlying claim . . . 
and any indemnity or contribution claims in a single case.”159  Rule 
14(c)(1) is the only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that addresses 
contribution in the limited scope of admiralty law, and even there it is  
referred to as a remedy.160  In fact, in Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees, 
which the Second Circuit cites to in Chemung,161 Bogert expressly 
denotes inter-fiduciary contribution as a cause of action and makes no 
reference to any procedural device distinction.162  Finally, while different 
from trust law, under tort law the Supreme Court has held the rights of 
contribution and indemnification for tortfeasors who are statutorily 
jointly liable as independent causes of action.163  For these reasons, the 
courts cannot rely on the implementation of contribution as a procedural 
device, but must rather examine whether contribution and 
indemnification are implied private rights of action under ERISA.  To do 
so, they should first apply the Touche test. 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 158. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.03(1) (3d ed. 2019). 
 159. Id. 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c)(1) (“If a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 
9(h), the defendant or a person who asserts a right under Supplemental Rule C(6)(a)(i) may, as a 
third-party plaintiff, bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable—either to 
the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff—for remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”) (emphasis added). 
 161. Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/MD, 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 162. GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES § 701 (2019) (“The trustee 
who is obliged to pay more than his or her proportionate share of the damage may have a cause of 
action for contribution against the co-trustees who are equally or more guilty.”).  
 163. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1993). 
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2. The Touche Test 
a. The Language and Focus of the Statute 
As the Touche Court stressed: “[W]ith any case involving the 
interpretation of a statute, [the] analysis must begin with the language of 
the statute itself.”164  In addition to the language of the statute, courts 
should also examine the statutory scheme.165  Keeping this in mind, we 
turn to the provisions at the center of debate: ERISA § 409 (29 U.S.C. § 
1109) and ERISA § 502(a)(2)–(3) (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)–(3)). 
i. ERISA § 409(a) 
ERISA § 409(a) states: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any 
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries 
by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan 
any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to 
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through 
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such 
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, 
including removal of such fiduciary.  A fiduciary may also be removed 
for a violation of section 1111 of this title.166 
The plain language of § 409(a) provides three ways in which a 
breaching fiduciary may remedy its breach: (1) by “mak[ing] good to 
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from the breach;” (2) by 
restoring to the plan any profits earned by the fiduciary via prohibited 
use of the assets; and (3) through such other equitable or remedial relief 
as the court “may deem appropriate.”167  The first two very plainly state 
that the plan is the beneficiary of the relief.  The third, however, is 
ambiguous. 
To discover the meaning of the third form of relief, we must “give 
effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”168  Let us assume for 
this section that “equitable relief” includes contribution and 
 
 164. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 
441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979)). 
 165. See id. at 571–72 (examining statutory scheme to support decision not to imply a private 
remedy). 
 166. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012). 
 167. Id. 
168.Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
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indemnification.  Note the conjunction used to combine the three 
remedies is not disjunctive; therefore, this is a good indication that the 
remedies allotted in the third part should relate to the first two remedies 
rather than be one with a completely different meaning.169 
We then look at the context in which this phrase is being used.170  
The phrase follows two other remedies, both of which are directed 
towards the plan alone.  Further, these first two remedies are legal 
remedies—monetary damages for losses suffered as a result of the 
breach, or the actual losses plus any lost gains.  Therefore, we can infer 
that Congress intended this third to be for the benefit of the plan and to 
add equitable remedies to the plan’s arsenal in addition to the 
aforementioned legal remedies.  Finally, the example provided in the 
statute, although not by any means exhaustive, offers relief to the plan by 
removing the fiduciary from its administration.  This also adds credence 
to the inference that Congress intended the remedies to be for the benefit 
of the plan alone.  Cofiduciary contribution and indemnification should 
therefore not be found in ERISA § 409(a).  The Supreme Court 
employed a similar analysis in Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Russell when it came to the same conclusion for a different remedy.171 
ii. ERISA § 502(a) and (3) 
ERISA § 502(a) begins with the words, “A civil action may be 
brought,” and then splits the possible plaintiffs into numbered 
paragraphs.  The paragraphs relevant to this discussion due to their 
affording of causes of action to fiduciaries are (2) and (3).172 
ERISA § 502(a)(2) states, “by the Secretary, or by a participant, 
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this 
title.”173  This section allows the participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries 
to bring an action to recover the relief available under ERISA § 409.174  
 
 169.  See id. (“Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be 
given separate meanings . . . .”).  While the analysis in Reiter was aimed towards words joined by 
disjunctive conjunctions, it would seem appropriate to extend such a concept to phrases as well. 
 170. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (“[T]he plainness or ambiguity 
of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” 
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018) (stating that “[l]inguistic and statutory context also matter” when 
determining a statute’s meaning). 
 171. 473 U.S. 134, 139–44 (1985). 
 172. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012). 
 173. Id. § 1132(a)(2).  
 174. Id.  
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Because this relief is only available to the plan,175 we can infer that 
ERISA § 502(a)(2) only allows individuals to bring actions for the 
benefit of the plan.  The Supreme Court also reached this conclusion in 
Russell.176 
ERISA § 502(a)(3) proves more problematic.  It states: 
[B]y a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the 
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress 
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan.177 
Subparagraph (B) provides the strongest avenue for an argument in 
favor of cofiduciary contribution and indemnification.  It opens the 
question as to whether “other appropriate equitable relief” can include 
contribution and indemnification.  After looking at the definition of 
“equitable remedy,” one could suggest it does. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Equitable Remedy” as “a remedy, 
usually a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or specific 
performance, obtained when available legal remedies, usually monetary 
damages, cannot adequately redress the injury.  Historically, an equitable 
remedy was available only from a court of equity.”178  In CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara, the Supreme Court used a similar definition, explaining that 
“appropriate equitable relief” here means “those categories of relief that, 
traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity) 
were typically available in equity.”179  
Traditionally, equity had exclusive jurisdiction over trust law 
because “the common law recognizes no action for breach of trust.”180  
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Chancery courts had extended 
contribution to traditional trust law and “recognized indemnity without 
an agreement.”181  The United States courts followed in this 
development, establishing that contribution and indemnity were first 
equitable remedies.182  Therefore, the plain language of the statute 
 
 175. See supra Section III.A.2.a.i. 
 176. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144. 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).  
 178. Equitable Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 179. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439 (2011) (quoting Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. 
Servs., 547 U.S. at 356, 361 (2006)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 180. Flint, supra note 10, at n.37 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 181. Id. at 11.  
 182. Id. 
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arguably contemplates that equitable relief includes contribution and 
indemnification. 
But the analysis does not end there.  We must also examine the rest 
of the subsection.  The statute limits this equitable relief to that which is 
appropriate to redress violations of any subchapter of ERISA or terms of 
the plan.183  While claims for contribution tend to occur simultaneously 
with the underlying issue, claims for contribution are independent and 
occur when the defendant seeks contribution from other guilty parties for 
the amount for which it has been found liable.184  Given that each guilty 
cofiduciary is jointly and severally liable,185 the relief available for the 
plan and its beneficiaries is not reduced or affected by whether 
contribution or indemnification exist.  Contribution and indemnification 
are thus there only for the benefit of the fiduciaries and play no role in 
whether the plan or its beneficiaries are properly remedied.  Although 
contribution and indemnification do not affect the proper compensation 
of the plan or its beneficiaries, such relief is arguably nonetheless an 
“appropriate” means for the guilty parties to go about redressing the 
violations.  After all, the adjective in the statute is not “necessary.”186 
According to Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 
“appropriate” means “especially suitable or compatible; [fitting].”187  
Because contribution and indemnification do not affect the ultimate 
payout received by the plan or beneficiaries, perhaps such remedies are 
compatible with ERISA in a suit by a fiduciary against another for the 
purpose of redressing a violation.  Furthermore, ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A) 
and (B)(ii) cover two other forms of equitable relief: injunction and 
specific performance.  The separation of the clauses from subsection 
(B)(i) by a disjunctive conjunction would suggest we attempt to provide 
a distinction to the equitable relief available under subsection (B)(i).188  
But even “appropriate relief” is limited to redressing violations.189  
Furthermore, implying such a benefit to breaching fiduciaries who are 
the very parties that ERISA sought to regulate seems inconsistent with 
the general purpose of the statute which is so focused on the 
 
 183. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012). 
 184. Contribution Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 185. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2012).  
 186. Id. § 1109(a). 
 187. Appropriate, WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (G. & C. Merriam Co. 
1963).  Readers will be relieved to know that the definition of the word as it was known in 1975 is 
the same as what we now know it to mean. 
 188. § 1132(a)(3).  
 189. See supra Section III.A.2.a.ii. 
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beneficiaries.  A plain reading of the statute would thus not imply 
cofiduciary contribution or indemnification.  At the very best one could 
argue that the statute is ambiguous.  But even if ambiguous, the 
legislative history does not support the creation of such a remedy. 
b. Legislative History 
The Court has seen ERISA’s structural scheme and complexity as 
evidence that Congress specifically did not intend to imply remedies that 
it “simply forgot” to include.190  Given the time Congress took to craft 
such a complex remedial structure, it is unlikely that Congress forgot to 
incorporate the remedies in question.191  By looking at the legislative 
history, however, it becomes very clear that cofiduciary contribution or 
indemnification were nowhere near the forefront of Congress’s mind.  
While this does not show that Congress did not intend to include the 
remedies, it does not favor their creation either.  However, the 
development of ERISA throughout its different incarnations seems to 
suggest that Congress did not intend to implicitly authorize the inclusion 
of the equitable remedies of contribution and indemnification for the 
benefit of cofiduciaries. 
Congress originally intended to regulate retirement benefits, 
particularly pensions, with the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 
(WPPDA) in 1958.192  Congress then amended the WPPDA in 1962 to, 
in part, confer “investigatory and various regulatory powers upon the 
Secretary over pension and welfare funds.”193  However, all the WPPDA 
required was disclosure, but the information disclosed was minimal.194  
The WPPDA also failed to sufficiently outline the duties of fiduciaries to 
the plan, and many plans fell prey to their mismanagement.195  Congress 
thus proposed to amend the current law with a new bill, albeit still in 
gestation, which along with a plethora of other things, “in essence, 
codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles 
 
 190. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (stating that “Congress 
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.”). 
 191. See id. (“The assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect upon close 
consideration of ERISA’s interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in 
turn part of a comprehensive and reticulated statute.”  (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980))).  
 192. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1985) 
repealed by Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1971, 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (2012). 
 193. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4840 (1973), 1973 WL 12550.  
 194. Id. at 4863. 
 195. See id. at 4865 (noting that without more defined fiduciary responsibilities, state trust laws 
had caused courts to allow deviations from plans). 
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developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.”196  This general principle 
is usually extended as evidence to show that cofiduciary contribution and 
indemnification should likewise be allowed.197 
However, note the qualifier, “certain.”  The Senate noted that many 
plans were “structured in such a way that it [was] unclear whether the 
traditional law of trusts [was] applicable.”198  Many plans were formed 
and funded under insurance principles and placed only minimal 
restrictions on its administration.199  Additionally, even when plans relied 
on trust law, trust law allowed certain exemptions from liability for 
trustees who deviated from what we now consider their fiduciary duty.200  
These exemptions, while allowed in scenarios when the trustee could be 
following the instructions of the settlor, were simply inapplicable in an 
employee benefit plan covering thousands of participants.201  Further, by 
providing standards with which to measure fiduciary conduct, Congress 
hoped to equip participants with safeguards to protect their own rights 
and plan assets.202  Thus, the Senate hoped to give participants the full 
weight of any rights they could have under trust law.  Fiduciaries, 
instead, would look to trust law for their duties.203 
Congress discussed the applicability of trust law to fiduciary 
responsibilities by pointing out the proposed modifications to then 
section 15(a), (b), and (c) of the WPPDA204 where it incorporated the 
“core principles of fiduciary conduct as adopted from existing trust 
law.”205  Congress explained that sections 15(d) and (e) codified rules 
from the law of trusts that make fiduciaries personally liable, but again it 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. IADA Servs., 497 F.3d 862, 864–65 (8th Cir. 
2007); Chesemore v. Fenkell, 829 F.3d 803, 811–812 (7th Cir. 2016) (discussing that ERISA’s grant 
of equitable remedy power to the courts allows the courts to order indemnification or contribution). 
 198. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4865 (1973), 1973 WL 12550. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 4871 (“The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both 
the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing 
violations of the Retirement Income Security for Employees Act as well as the amendments made to 
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.  The intent of the Committee is to provide the full 
range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove 
jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective 
enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law or recovery of benefits due to 
participants.”). 
 204. Compare S. 4, 93d Cong. § 510 (1973), with 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012).  
 205. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 4866 (1973), 1973 WL 12550. 
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did not discuss remedies amongst cofiduciaries.206 
In the thousands of pages of legislative history spanning the four to 
five years it took to draft ERISA, I have only been able to find one 
reference that may possibly be taken to apply general trust principles to 
remedies.  In House Conference Report No. 93-1280, one month before 
the enactment of ERISA, the report succinctly states: “In addition, the 
general rules of co-fiduciary liability are to apply.”207  Alone, perhaps 
this statement encompasses the remedies of contribution or 
indemnification, but that sentence is nestled in a paragraph explaining 
how a trustee becomes liable for the acts of another trustee, 
notwithstanding the allocation of duties, for failing to comply with other 
fiduciary standards such as the prudent man standard––the standard 
which as we have seen above is one of the specific things the courts have 
a directive to interpret.208  Again, Congress seems more concerned with 
duties and liability than with remedies. 
An examination of the development of the remedial sections of 
ERISA also suggests that Congress not only failed to consider 
contribution and indemnification but also did not intend to implicitly 
authorize them.  In 1968, the new and improved remedies still focused on 
awarding participants and beneficiaries penalties for the failure of their 
plan administrator to provide them with certain documentation, but also 
introduced the ability for beneficiaries and participants to recover 
damages for the fiduciary’s breach of their fiduciary duty, to enjoin the 
fiduciary, and to remove the fiduciary.209  If any trust law applied, it was 
the following: 
[B]asically . . . the elementary trust law doctrine that if a trustee loses 
trust property by his wrongdoing or fails to perform any of the duties 
placed upon him and causes thereby a loss to the trust funds, the 
beneficiary is entitled to compel the trustee to restore the trust property 
or to pay into the fund the amount of damages suffered.210 
Yet, this application was to section 14(g) and (j), the sections on 
fiduciary liability and the voiding of any exculpatory agreement—
subsections (i) and (j) of section 9 were added simply to facilitate the 
enforcement of those new sections.211 
 
 206. Id. at 4869. 
 207. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 5081 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), 1974 WL 11542. 
 208. Id. 
 209. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1867, § 9(b)–(i) at *12–13 (1968), 1968 WL 98951. 
 210. Id. at 8. 
 211. Id. 
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By 1970, the enforcement action had taken the wording with which 
we are more familiar now, but notably lacked any reference to a civil 
cause of action for fiduciaries.212  The relief was limited in favor of 
beneficiaries or participants alone in section 9(e)(1), or as a class in 
section 9(e)(2), and to the Secretary in section 9(e)(3).213  Although the 
structure changed slightly, the remedies stayed the same in the House’s 
January 1971214 and December 1971215 versions and in the Senate’s 
December 1971 version as well.216  By early 1972, Congress began 
toying around with the idea of a completely new act rather than an 
amendment of the WPPDA, and soon thereafter introduced the 
Retirement Income Security for Employees Act, which again seemed to 
limit the relief to beneficiaries.217 
It was not until January 1973 when fiduciaries finally made it into 
the remedial sections—albeit still as a modification to the WPPDA—
under section 106(e)(2).218  Section 106(e)(2) limited this relief to that in 
section 111(d).  Section 111(d) mirrored ERISA § 409 with the same 
language expressly in favor of relief for the plans only.219  Several 
months later under Report No. 93-533, Congress kept the same available 
remedies as discussed in the earlier version under its new section 
503(a)(2), but also gave fiduciaries the ability to “enjoin any act or 
practice which violate[d] any provision of [the] Act.”220  The latter 
language appears again in a September 1973 version221 and then in a 
February 1974 version.222 
Congress then held hearings on the February 1974 version for the 
next few months––from February to June.  Not one discussed cofiduciary 
contribution or indemnification.  Finally, on August 13, 1974, the now 
troublesome language finally made its appearance, but the accompanying 
commentary lacked any discussion on the change.223  Instead, Senator 
Harrison Arlington Williams Jr., the Chairman of the Senate Committee 
 
 212. See H.R. 16462, 91st Cong. § 9(e) (1970), 1970 WL 123013. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See H.R. 1269, 92d Cong. § 106(e) (1971), 1971 WL 134914. 
 215. See H.R. 12337, 92d Cong. § 9(e) (1971), 1971 WL 134915. 
 216. See S. 3024, 92d Cong. § 9(e) (1971), 1972 WL 136895. 
 217. See S. 3598, 92d Cong. § 603 (1972), 1972 WL 136896. 
 218. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 106(e) (1973), 1973 WL 172984. 
 219. Compare H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 106(e) (1973), 1973 WL 172984, with ERISA § 409(a), 29 
U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012).  See also supra Section III.A.2.i. 
 220. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 § 503(e)(3), at *52 (1973), 1973 WL 172986. 
 221. See H.R. 10489, 93d Cong. § 106(e)(3) (1973), 1974 WL 186654.  
 222. See H.R. 12781, 93d Cong. § 503(e)(3) (1974), 1973 WL 172998. 
 223. See S. REP. NO. 93-1090 § 502(a)(3), at *70 (1974), 1974 WL 186651. 
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on Labor and Public Welfare, addressed the overall imposition of 
fiduciary duties on those managing assets by explaining its objectives: 
[T]o make applicable the law of trusts; to prohibit exculpatory clauses 
that have often been used in this field; to establish uniform fiduciary 
standards to prevent transactions which dissipate or endanger plan 
assets; and to provide effective remedies for breaches of trust.224 
Note the understood distinction between making applicable the law 
of trusts to fiduciary duties and the provision of effective remedies. 
Given the lack of discussion in the legislative history, it is clear that 
cofiduciary contribution and indemnification were nowhere near the 
forefront of Congress’s mind when enacting ERISA.  However, while the 
dive into the legislative history is not helpful in clearing up the 
ambiguity, it does shed light on the extent of the application of trust law 
principles to ERISA, i.e. for the benefit of participants or the plan rather 
than fiduciaries, an argument which will be more relevant in the 
discussion of federal common law. 
c. ERISA’s Purpose 
Throughout the three sections in ERISA’s declarations of policy, 
Congress set forth their main goal: the protection of employees and their 
beneficiaries.225  Congress strove to achieve this goal by requiring 
disclosure and reporting, setting standards of conduct for fiduciaries, 
vesting accrued benefits, setting minimum standards of funding and 
requiring termination insurance.226  From this  language, courts also 
determined that ERISA sought to “safeguard the financial integrity of 
qualified plans by shielding them from unanticipated claims,”227 and “to 
encourage employers to offer and maintain welfare benefit plans.”228  
Cofiduciary contribution and indemnification do not play any role in 
furthering these goals. 
Contribution and indemnification do not influence disclosure and 
reporting.  Contribution and indemnification also do not positively 
influence the standards of conduct for fiduciaries.  In fact, the remedies 
may arguably reduce the watchdog effect joint and several liability 
creates among cofiduciaries.  This is because the fiduciaries would be 
 
 224. 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).  
 225. See supra Section III.A.2.a.i–ii. 
 226. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)–(c) (2012).   
 227. Auto Owners Ins. v. Thorn Apple Valley, Inc., 31 F.3d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 228. Youngberg v. Bekins Co., 930 F. Supp. 1396, 1402 (E.D. Cal. 1996). 
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aware that they could shoulder off any liability they incur from another 
more culpable fiduciary to that fiduciary (assuming the other fiduciary 
has deep pockets).  Further, contribution and indemnification do not deal 
with vesting, funding, nor termination insurance.  Finally, they do not 
help shield plans from unanticipated claims, and they do not affect the 
rights of the beneficiaries or the obligations under the plan. 
Arguably, contribution and indemnification encourage employers to 
offer and maintain plans in the welfare plan context.  For example, in the 
welfare context, the employer may benefit from indemnification if it can 
hold the administrator liable for any miscalculations of claims when the 
administrator bears sole responsibility for making those calculations.229  
This benefit would incentivize employers to offer the plans.  However, 
this purported purpose has only been raised by one district court in 
California (and even then, its conclusion has been severely critiqued by 
its own sister courts).230  Nonetheless, even if cofiduciary contribution 
and indemnification were to further this purpose, it would not further 
many others, and the likely negative effect on cofiduciary responsibilities 
would outweigh any small positives in the health and welfare context. 
In sum, applying the Touche test reveals the following: first, the 
language of ERISA provides for some appropriate equitable remedies.  
Although contribution and indemnification are equitable remedies, 
however, their availability is limited to actions for the benefit of the plan 
or for the redressability of a breach of ERISA, rather than for the benefit 
of a breaching fiduciary.  Second, the legislative history reveals that 
Congress never explicitly considered cofiduciary contribution or 
indemnification.  Instead, the legislative history shows that Congress 
intended courts to develop ERISA with the breadth of trust law in 
determining the rights of participants under a plan and the duties of 
fiduciaries.  Third, contribution and indemnification do not add to the 
statute’s explicit purpose or further the majority of ERISA’s purposes as 
developed by the courts.  Given the ambiguous text, the silent legislative 
 
 229. Id. 
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history, and their failure to further ERISA’s explicit purposes, courts 
should not find implicit congressional authorization of contribution or 
indemnification in ERISA. 
The next question is whether courts may develop these remedies into 
the ERISA common law. 
B. Federal Common Law 
The Supreme Court has recognized the need and authority to 
formulate ERISA common law using trust law principles.231  However, 
trust law principles are not necessarily determinative of whether ERISA 
should follow suit.232  In fact, in regards to remedies, the Court has also 
stated that courts should consider ERISA’s carefully integrated scheme 
as “strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other 
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.”233  Some circuits 
have limited the circumstances in which they will develop this common 
law while others have laid out a set of factors to consider in determining 
whether to use this authority.  Applying those facts and circumstances to 
contribution and indemnification, and considering the Court’s 
abovementioned warnings reveals that the factors weigh in favor of not 
developing the federal common law. 
Some circuits have held back from developing common law unless 
they found themselves required to fill in “interstitially” or otherwise 
effectuate the ERISA statutory pattern and purposes enacted by 
Congress.234  This more limited approach does not lie in favor of finding 
cofiduciary contribution and indemnification.  Applying this principle, a 
court would have to examine the policies and purposes of ERISA.235  
Similarly, a court should find that the policies are strictly limited to 
favoring beneficiaries and plan health.  In doing so, a court should 
conclude that allowing fiduciaries to slack in their monitoring of other 
fiduciaries by relying on contribution or indemnification outweighs any 
benefits such remedies could bring, because even a more costly plan 
would be preferable to a disqualified one. 
 
 231. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).  
 232. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“[W]e believe that the law of trusts often 
will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties.”).  
 233. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).  
 234. See supra note 131.  
 235. See supra Section III.A.2.c. 
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The more liberal approach poses more of a problem.  As the Sixth 
Circuit recognized, a court has the power to determine when it is 
appropriate for the court to fashion federal law in “instances in which (1) 
ERISA is silent or ambiguous; (2) there is an awkward gap in the 
statutory scheme; or (3) federal common law is essential to the 
promotion of fundamental ERISA policies.”236  Here, the first factor 
weighs in favor of developing the common law because ERISA is silent 
about cofiduciary contribution and indemnification.  The two other 
factors, however, weigh against finding contribution or indemnification.  
It is unpersuasive to say that there is an awkward gap in the legislative 
scheme with respect to ERISA remedies.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that the remedial section is long and complex, and provides strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize the missing 
remedies.237  Courts should not narrowly construe the Court’s statement 
to extracontractual damages, as the Second and Seventh Circuit did in 
Chemung and Chesemore.  Even if the courts narrowly construe the 
legislative history––the same legislative history that gave the courts the 
power to draft federal common law––provides that ERISA codified 
“certain principles . . . of the law of trusts”—an implicit acknowledgment 
that Congress did not intend all trust principles to be part of ERISA.238  
Additionally, ERISA carefully details the duties and liabilities of 
fiduciaries—the drafts of which are based heavily upon trust law.  The 
omission was thus likely intentional, particularly given that the item 
omitted was some clearly established principle of trust law that Congress 
could not have missed when discussing fiduciaries.239  Finally, such 
remedies play no part in benefiting the plan or beneficiaries directly in 
accordance with the purposes set forth in the statute.  While under the 
Sixth Circuit’s factors only one factor is needed to develop federal 
common law.  However, courts should consider that two of the three 
factors weigh against the development of ERISA remedies for 
cofiduciary contribution or indemnification and leave such work to the 
legislative process. 
 
 236. DiGeronimo Aggregates, LLC v. Zelma, 763 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Local 6-
0682 Int’l Union of Paper, All. Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers v. Nat’l Indus. Grp. Pension Plan, 
342 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 237. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. 
 238. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at *28 (1973), 1973 WL 172969. 
 239. See NARDA, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. Nat’l Bank, 744 F. Supp. 685, 696 (D. Md. 
1990) (“[W]hen some clearly established aspect of common law is not incorporated, the omission 
would appear intended.”).  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
By correctly analyzing the issues under the directives of the Court in 
Texas Industries and Touche, courts can confidently conclude not to 
allow contribution and indemnification as ERISA remedies.  The 
analysis above allows for courts to both look for implicit congressional 
intent in the statute as written and to analyze their limited authority to 
develop ERISA federal common law.  At the very least, the above 
analysis creates a structure for courts to use when addressing the 
question, instead of using procedural device theories, incomplete 
analysis, or placing too much emphasis on the common law arguments 
and ignoring any possibilities that congressional intent conflicts with 
their conclusions.  It is noteworthy to consider how the Western District 
of New York, the district court which the Second Circuit reversed in 
Chemung, used this approach when it reached the same conclusion.240 
However, just because ERISA does not provide for cofiduciary 
contribution or indemnification, it does not mean that fiduciary 
defendants are out of luck.  An open question remains about whether 
these cofiduciaries may instead rely on claims for contribution or 
indemnification under state law liability theories or whether these claims 
are preempted by ERISA.  The Eighth Circuit held the state law claims to 
be preempted, but some district courts have held the opposite.241  While 
such a discussion may be for another time, at the moment it should be 
clear that regardless of the philosophy of analyzing courts, courts should 
not find cofiduciary contribution or indemnification as implicit remedies 
in ERISA, and they should be reluctant to create these remedies through 
federal common law. 
 
 
 240. Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 753 F. Supp. 81, 84–86 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), 
rev’d in part and aff’d in part by Chemung Canal Tr. Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 
1991). 
 241. Compare Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. IADA Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 862, 868 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t]o recognize a state-law cause of action that supplements the federal 
scheme in these circumstances would ‘pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress,’ 
and state common-law claims are therefore preempted” (internal citations omitted)), with Spear v. 
Fenkell, No. 13–02391, 2014 WL 7745845, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2014) (“I conclude that 
Pennsylvania law applies, and that the Stonehenge Parties may assert a contribution claim under 
state law in response to the state law causes of action alleged in the Complaint.”).  
